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Abstract—This study aims to examine the impact of 
information provided via the disclosure of intellectual capital on the 
cost of equity capital. It also examines the effect of good corporate 
governance on the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure 
and capital cost. It examines firms listed on the Indonesian stock 
exchange for period 2013 to 2015. Data were analyzed using 
moderated regression analysis. Results show that intellectual capital 
affects the increase of cost of capital. Good corporate governance 
variable has significant positive effect on cost of capital. Corporate 
governance could serve as a determinant that influences capital 
expenditures by investors. Interaction between intellectual capital 
disclosure index and good corporate governance has negative and 
significant effect to cost of capital, meaning good corporate 
governance could serve as a moderating variable that reduces the 
negative impact of intellectual capital disclosure index on cost of 
capital. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N the current era of knowledge-based and technology-based 
economies, companies are required to allocate more  
investment in research and development, employee training, 
and superior new technologies [1]. Around 50% to 90% of the 
value created by the firm in this era is the result of the 
management of intellectual capital [2]. This is in line with the 
statement of [3] that about 75% of the company's market value  
in America is the result of intangible assets. Thus, the role of 
intellectual capital in the acquisition of corporate value in this 
era of knowledge and globalization  is enormous. 
Since 1990, attention to intangible assets management practices 
has been increasing widely. One approach used in the 
assessment and measurement of intangible assets is the 
intellectual capital that has become the focus of attention in 
various fields, such as management, information technology, 
sociology, and accounting [4]. Some studies indicate that 
intellectual capital plays a significant role in the improvement 
of corporate value, among others, [5], [6], [7], and [8]. 
By  having a strong and well-managed   intellectual capital, the 
company   will   be   able   to   anticipate   future  environmental 
uncertainty. If  the company provides intensive and sustainable 
training  and employee  skills  development, applying  adequate 
information   technology, and  maintaining   good  relationships 
with customers and suppliers, it will be able to anticipate the 
possibility the entry of new competitors. 
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 If one day a new competitor enters, then the company 
should be able to survive because of the support of 
intellectualcapital. [3] argue that intellectual capital plays an 
important role in preparing the company's competitive strategy 
advantage. 
The empowerment of intellectual capital not only improve 
performance from within the company  but also gain  investor 
confidence in the ability of the company. Chen et al. (2005) state 
that if the market is efficient, then investors will give higher 
value to firms with higher intellectual capital. The financial 
statements are unable to reflect the ownership of the intangible 
assets so as to increase the investment risk thereby eliminating 
investor confidence [9] and [10]. İn addition, [ 7 ]  show that 
the company's intellectual capital had an effect on the 
company's future performance as measured by stock return 
change one year ahead. On the one hand, there are problems as 
intellectual capital is difficult to measure  and cannot be 
reported in the company's financial statements. One way that 
can be done is to provide information about this intellectual 
capital to investors through voluntary disclosure in the 
company's annualreport. İn this respect, [11] state that the 
disclosure of one aspect of intellectual capital i.e., human 
capital proved to have a significant impact on stockreturns of 1 
year or 5 years later. Study by [12] analyzes the reporting of 
intellectual capital on the 20 best companies in Australia and 
show that the company’s overall emphasis is that intellectual 
capital is critical to achieving success in the face of future 
competition. İn addition, [13] examine the voluntary reporting 
of intellectual capital by firms in Australia and Hong Kong. 
Their results indicate that the level of intellectual capital 
disclosure is quite low qualitatively in both Australia and Hong 
Kong. 
Another factor that is also proven to increase investor’s 
assessment of corporate performance is good corporate governance 
(GCG). The influence of corporate governance on corporate 
value is due to agency problems within the company arising as a 
result of the separation of control and ownership. This separation 
creates a conflict of interest that will ultimately negatively affect 
the company’s value. Implementation of GCG within the company 
is expected to reduce the agency problem, so in the end it is 
expected to increase the value of the company. Some empirical 
studies that examine the relationship of corporate governance 
practice and the value or performance of the firm try to 
accommodate some components of corporate governance 
practice by developing and/or using an index or corporate    
governance    practice    ranking.     
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The    corporate governance index or rank is a scoring based 
on the quantification of the evaluation of corporate governance 
components in the enterprise. The index score or corporate 
governance rating is then tested in relation to the performance 
or value of the firm.  One study, [14], find that the 
implementation of corporate governance can increase the 
company’s stock returns. The other study by [15] show that the 
corporate governance index is positively correlated with the 
operational performance and market valuation. Other studies by 
[16], [17], [18], [19], and [20], report almost similar  to those of 
[15]. 
The quality of accounting information can reduce the 
information risk so that in the end it will also reduce the cost of 
equity capital. Previous studies, for example [21], [22], [23], 
[24], [25], and [26], have shown a negative relationship between 
information quality and cost of equity capital. The argument 
behind this intuition is that improving the quality of information  
will lower the information asymmetry. Reduced information  
asymmetry and increased stockliquidity would lower transaction 
costs that will ultimately lower cost of equity capital, see for 
example [27], [28], and [29]. 
This study examines the impact of information provided via 
the disclosure of intellectual capital on the cost of equity 
capital. It also examines GCG as a factor affecting the 
relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and capital  
cost. This research is important given the important role of 
intellectual capital in corporate development and the delivery of 
intellectual capital information to investors in order to reduce 
capital costs due to the existence of information asymmetry. 
The role of GCG as a monitoring tool for corporate managers 
will also be examined by including the role of GCG in 
moderating the relationship between intellectual capital 
information disclosure and capital cost. The results of this 
study are expected to contribute to the development and 
management of intellectual capital in Indonesia. 
 
 
II. THEORY AND  HYPOTHESES 
A. Agency Theory 
As shown in [29], the agency theory assumes that all 
individuals act on their behalf. They define agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent” (p. 5). The agency relationship 
between agent and principal within the company can occur for 
example, between managers and shareholders or bondholders, 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, and 
between managers and suppliers 
In the contract theory or agency theory, the corporate entity 
is seen as the ‘nexus of contract’, a group of interested parties 
and each party has rights as stated in their respective contracts, 
see [29] and [30]. Each individual in this contract has an 
incentive to maximize their respective interests, resulting in 
agency costs that can reduce firm value [31]. 
Firms often differ in quality, whether in the form of goods 
and services, information, and investment opportunities, or in 
the securities of their entity-in the form of stocks, bonds, or 
other valuable securities [32]. Given the asymmetry of 
information occurring in the capital market, those with more 
information (e.g., insiders) will take advantage of the 
opportunity to gain higher returns than the less well informed 
parties. To reduce information asymmetry, and to differentiate 
high quality firms from other low quality companies, high-type 
managers send signals in the form of information to the market 
[32]. A signal can be defined as “... an action taken by a high-
type manager that would not be rational if that low-type” ([32: 
457]). Signal mechanisms can be diverse, such as signals 
conveyed by high-quality managers in the form of more 
informative  intellectual capital disclosures. 
 
B. Intellectual Capital Disclosures and Cost of Capital 
Disclosure of information in the annual reports is expected to 
reduce information asymmetry and also reduce agency problem 
[33].  Theoretically,  increased disclosure by firms can lower 
transaction costs thus increasing stock liquidity and decreasing 
uncertainty as well as reducing the adverse selection issues [28]. 
Better voluntary disclosure will also improve  market performance 
[34]. The decision to disclose additional information must be 
based on the cost-benefit considerations. 
The company may provide information  to  stakeholders 
regarding the operations of activities and the impact of these 
activities. One of the company’s operating activities is the 
disclosure of the company's intellectual capital. Good 
disclosures are expected to reduce the information asymmetry 
between management and investors so as to reduce the cost of 
company’s capital. Some studies indicate positive influence of 
voluntary disclosure that is lowering cost of capital [21] and 
[35]. Thus, better intellectual capital disclosures will decrease 
the cost of capital. This argument leads to the following  
hypothesis. 
 
H1: Intellectual capital disclosures lower  the cost of capital. 
 
C. Good Corporate Governance, Intellectual Capital 
Disclosures and Cost of Capital 
Corporate governance is one of the mechanisms aimed at 
minimizing agency conflicts by aligning relationships among 
stakeholders to determine the direction and control of the 
company performance. How the owner can monitor and control 
the decisions and actions of the top managers will influence the 
implementation of corporate strategy. Effective corporate 
governance will align  the interests of managers and owners so 
as to produce a competitive advantage for the company. 
The principles of GCG are fairness,  transparency, 
accountability, and responsibility. Justice with respect  to 
fairness and equality of the treatment of minority  shareholders 
to be protected from fraud, trafficking and abuse by insiders 
(self-dealing or insider wrong doing). Transparency is  carried 
out   through  accurate   and  timely    disclosure   of   company 
Bangkok Thailand Oct 26-27,  2017, 19 (10) Part XVII
2084
performance information. Management accountability is exercised 
through effective oversight based on the balance of power 
between supervisors, managers, shareholders, and auditors. 
The company’s responsibilities relates to the company as a 
member of society to obey the law and to act wisely in the 
environment in which it operates. 
According to the agency theory, GCG mechanisms and 
voluntary disclosure can be used to protect investors and reduce 
conflicts of interest between owners and agents. This  theory 
also states that disclosure will lower agency costs [29]. GCG 
mechanisms will be able to pressure managers to better 
disclose information Voluntary  disclosure will reduce 
information asymmetry and will ultimately have an impact on 
capital cost reductions. This negative impact will also depend on 
the company's management condition. If the company is well 
managed, this condition will strengthen the impact of 
intellectual capital disclosure on the reduction of capital costs. 
Thus the following  hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H2: Good corporate governance reduces the effect of 
intellectual capital disclosures on cost of capital 
 




Based on the criteria of the sample selection,  a total of 83 
companies were selected. The sample selection procedure can 
be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Selection of Sample  Process 
 
No. Description Total
1 Company meeting the first two criteria 
2 Company with outliers data 7
Final sample
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables 
examined in the study. As can be seenin the table, the intellectual 
capital disclosure index ranges from 0.0329 to 0.3406, with an 
average of 0.2044. This indicates that there is a relatively low 
index value among the compaies examined in this study. 
The Model 
This research will use multiple regression analysis method with 
moderated regression analysis (MRA) technique. The analysis 
technique of moderated regression analysis (MRA) is  an 
analysis to find out the relationship of  influence between a 
variable to other variables where there are moderation variables 
that influence the relationship between independent variable to 
dependent variable as stated in the research design in the 
previous section. The following model is used to test the 
hypotheses. 
 
COC = α0 + α1ICDI + α2GCG + α3ICDI*GCG  + α4SIZE + 
α5LEV + e 
 
 
Where COC is the cost of capital measured using the 
Ohlson model. This measured as issued in a number of studies, 
for example [35] and [21].  ICDI  is  the intellectual capital 
disclosures indexmeasured using the content analysis based on 
[37]. Previous studies, [38], [39], and [2], and [40], also use this 
measure. GCG is good corporate governance index measured 
using the Indonesia of corporate governance rating agency, 
Size is the size of the firm measured as the natural logarithm of 
totalassets. Previous studies, [42] and [43], also use this 
measure.  LEV is leverage measured as the ration of total debts 
over total assets. This variable is used in [42] and [43]. 
 
Sample 
The population used in this study are manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange over the 
period of 2013-2015. The sample is determined using the 
following criteria company does not engage in  any corporate 
actions during the period of analysis, such as merger or 
acquisition and the company’s annual report is accessible. 
Company with outlier data will  be excluded. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard
Deviation
ICDI 0.0329 0.0329 0.2044 0.0679
ICG 0.5101 0.7975 0.6166 0.2133
ICDI*ICG 0.0211 0.2218 0.1317 0.0737
Size 17.4813 28.4638 25.9840 2.9141
Lev 0.0977 0.7985 0.4086 0.1823
CoC -0.9853 2.1849 0.1160 0.7787
 
Similar  results are reported for GCG  index of which the 
average is 0.6166. this figure is considerable low. In terms of 
leverage, on average, the companies in this study have a total 
debt of half of their assets. The cost of capital interestingly 
has a negative value. This seems to be strange. In addition, the 
maximum cost of capital is higher than 100 percent. This is also 
strange. 
 






Constant -3.136 -2.921 0.005
ICDI negative 0.772 2.177 0.033
ICG negative 1.055 2.659 0.010
ICDI*ICG negative -0.851 -2.637 0.010
Size negative 0.250 2.369 0.020
Lev positive -0.005 -0.045 0.964
R2 (Adj. R2) 0.582 (0.339) 
F-Stat (F-sig) 4.158 (0.000) 
 
The results of hypotheses testing are presented in Table 3. 
As can be seen in Table 3, hypothesis one (H1) cannot be 
accepted as the sign is positive, whilst the study predicts it 
shall be negative. This finding is interesting given more  
disclosures are associated with higher cost of capital.  Similar 
finding is reported for the good corporate governance index. A 
positive coefficient is  generated.






The effect of Intellectual Capital Disclosure on Cost of 
Capital 
The results of statistical tests showed that ICDI 
variables have a positive effect on the COC. This means 
that high corporate intellectual capital disclosure would 
increase the cost of capital, which indicates that the 
company’s information  about intellectual capital can 
make  the financial statements presented by the company 
more transparent and influence the investor's estimate of 
the risks that exist in the company. Examin ing the 
relationship of intellectual capital disclosure on the cost 
of capital would help managers to understand the 
impact of applying intellectual capital on corporate 
finance. The results of this study are consistent with 
[43]who find evidence that the greater the level of 
accounting disclosure done by the company accompanied 
by good information,  the lower the cost of capital. 
 
Moderating Effect of Good Corporate Governance on 
the Relationship between Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure and Cost of Capital 
The results of this study indicates that good corporate 
governance has a significant negative effect in 
moderating the influence of ICDI on cost of capital. The 
results of this study prove that GCG is a moderating 
variable. The effect of ICDI*ICG on cost of capital 
relationship is inversely proportional, whereas the higher 
ICDI*ICG value, the lower the cost of capital value. This 
condition reflects that GCG exercises good control over 
managers so that it can lower the capital cost incurred by 
investors. 
This study uses company size control variables (Size) 
and debt ratio (Leverage). Many intellectual capital 
disclosures are often associated with firm size. The bigger 
the company, the lower will be the cost of capital. 
Conversely with leverage ratio, companies that have a 
high leverage will do a lot of disclosure that will  
eventually lower the cost of capital. The results of this 
study show size has positive and significant coefficient. 
This is strange as we expect that larger firm will be 
associated with lower cost of capital. This is consistent 
with research conducted by [43]. Yet, the finding reported 
here  is inconsistent with the one of [44]. 
The coefficient of leverage is insignificant. So, we 
may conclude that leverage level is not related to the level 
of cost of capital. This means that neither companies 
with high leverage or low leverage have no effect on 
intellectual capital disclosure with cost of capital issued 





Based on the discussion the following conclusions are 
generate. Intellectual capital disclosure index has 
significant positive effect on the cost of capital. The 
interaction between intellectual capital   disclosure   index   
and   good   corporate   governance 
generates negative and significant effect on cost of  
capital, which means that good corporate governance 
can serve as a moderating variable that reduces the 
negative impact of intellectual capital disclosure index  
on cost of capital. Good corporate governance has 
significant positive effect on cost of capital. This means 
that corporate governance can serve as a determinant 
variable affecting the cost of capital. 
Limitations and the suggestions that can be offered 
based on the limitations of this study are as follows.  This s 
tudy uses a sample of manufacturing companies with two 
years of observation. Further research is  suggested to use 
longer observation period, to produce more accurate in 
showing the implications that exist mainly related to the 
disclosure made by the company. This study uses the 
Ohlson's model as a proxy to measure cost of capital. 
Further study may use other proxies such as weighted 
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